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ROLES OF STATES AND PROVINCES IN TAXATION ISSUES
BETWEEN CANADA AND UNITED STATES
Robert D. Brown*

Most discussions on the influence of taxation on international trade and
investment concentrate on national tax systems. But both Canada and the
United States are federal states, with provincial and state governments having
considerable autonomy and raising substantial tax revenues through their
independent taxation systems. Given the diversity and complexity of such
sub-national revenues, and the freedom of action possessed by the states and
provinces, it is only to be expected that their tax systems would have an
important influence on international trade and investment between the two
countries.
This paper will deal with a number of issues relating to sub-national taxes
between Canada and the US, but at a level of some generality. The details
involved in the application of sub-national taxes in over 60 jurisdictions are
of mind-numbing complexity, and of interest largely to those businesses that
have to cope with them.
Fiscal positions of sub-national governments
Because I am an accountant, I will start by reviewing the fiscal and tax
positions of the Canadian provinces relative to those of the states in the
United States.

Past Chairman, Price Waterhouse Canada
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Table 1 Canada- United States Provincial/ State Fiscal Comparisons
United
Canada
States
Billions

Per Capita

Billions

Per Capital

(Can $)

(US $ at
purchasing
power
parity)

(US $)

(US $ at
purchasing
power
parity)

$189

4,993

1,038

3,837

Tax
revenue

127

3,203

482

1,791

Gross
expenditur
es

193

4,873

893

3,314

Debt

443

11,192

465

1,728

Provinces/States
Gross
revenue
(including
grants)

Note: Statistics are for 1997for Canada, 1996 for US taxes, from 2000
edition of Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, International Monetary
Fund. Per capita figures calculated at an arbitrarily assumed purchasing
power parity of $1 CAN = .75 US, based on 1996 populations. Data may not
be totally comparable.
The assistanceof the Department of Financeand the Department of External Affairs Canada
and of PricewaterhouseCoopersin assembling information is gratefully appreciated. The
remarks of the author,and the materialpresented,are entirely the responsibilityof the author,
and should not be attributedto any organizationto which he may be connected.

Table 1 (above) shows that the Canadian provinces have higher levels of per
capita gross revenue, taxes, spending, and - especially - debt than is the case
with the states in the United States, all measured at an assumed purchasing
power parity.
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Table 2 summarizes the rate at which tax revenues at the national and subnational levels have expanded in the last 20 years, showing a remarkable
overall consistency in this growth.
Table 2 Increases in Government Tax Revenues By Level of Government
1979- 1999

$ Millions
Canada (Can $)
1979

1999

%
Increase

$32,325

$123,637

282

8.679

30,414

250

Federal

36,699

139,459

280

Total

77,703

293,510

278

205,992

973,695

276

80,650

298,626

270

Federal

315,365

1,117,418

254

Total

602,007

2,189,735

264

Provincial

Municipal/Local

United States (US $)

State

Municipal/Local

Source: OECD Revenue Statistics
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Overall, the information in these first two tables shows that the Canadian
provinces:
1. Have a much larger relative share of total tax revenues (almost 90% of
Canadian federal tax revenues in recent years) than the US states (perhaps
45% of US federal revenue).
2. Have much larger per capita tax revenues at purchasing power parity
(perhaps $3,200 in 1997) than US states (perhaps $1,800).
3. Have only moderately higher per capita total revenue, (including*intergovernment grants and other income) than US states.
4. Have larger per capital expenditures measured at purchasing power parity
than US states, but not by a huge margin (especially after allowing for higher
interest expenses).
5. Have far higher debt than US states. (Provinces used to run substantially
higher deficits, but in recent years have tended to work towards balanced
budgets. In the US, many states have had constitutional requirements for
balanced budgets for years).
Reviewing the composition of sub-national revenues and spending in recent
years, it is of interest that the tax revenues of the Canadian provinces have
increased at about the same rate as US states. However, the actual burden of
these taxes rose faster in Canada simply because Canadian incomes grew
more slowly over the last 20 years than in the United States. Another
noteworthy statistic is that the provinces in Canada have a far higher
proportion of total corporate taxes than the US states - perhaps double.
Constitutional Comparisons
Both provinces and states are said to be sovereign within assigned broad
areas of jurisdiction set out in the respective constitutions. Non-enumerated
areas of jurisdiction are left in US constitution to states, and in Canada to
federal government, but this has not been an important factor.
In US, broad interpretation by Supreme Court of federal powers, and the
widespread use of shared-cost programs, have led to a strong central
government with direct influences on many state programs. This has been
augmented by a public view that many issues are "national", requiring

Brown-ROLES OFSTATES/PROVINCES IN TAXATION

national intervention. Congress has the authority to regulate state taxing
actions under the due process and interstate commerce clauses of the US
Constitution if it appears that state taxation interferes with federal objectives.
In Canada, the right of Parliament to make such rules is much less clear, and
could be strongly resisted.
In Canada, restrictive interpretation of federal powers by the UK Privy
Council almost a century ago (the then ultimate judiciary authority in
Canada) led to strengthening of provincial authority, particularly with respect
to property and civil rights in the provinces. Federal shared cost programs
gave the federal government some influences, but were resented and resisted
by provinces, and they have been largely replaced by block grants. However,
partial inter-provincial "equalization" of provincial revenues is a
constitutionally recognized program in Canada that is lacking in the US.
Canadian constitutional interpretation has been heavily influenced by:
1. Quebec's demands for a distinctive and separate society
2. The diversity of the country and the relative down-playing of a "meltingpot" philosophy

Constitutional Taxing Powers
In Canada, provinces are constitutionally limited to direct taxation within the
province. This requires - in overly simple terms - that taxes be demanded of
the person that is expected to bear them - i.e., indirect taxes that will be
passed on in the same form are invalid. Taxes must also be levied only on
persons "found" within the province, requiring the equivalent of a "nexus".
Neither the Canadian provinces, nor the US states, are directly bound by
international tax treaties.
United States:
States may use any method of taxation, so long as it does not represent an
infringement of federal powers (as with respect to inter-state and foreign
trade, for example). The Supreme Court has required states to impose tax
only on persons having some "nexus" within the state. Such a required nexus
may be defined somewhat differently for income taxes and other taxes (such
as sales or use) but may be so slight as involving even the nominal
equipment or facilities in the state.
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There are two main limitations on states extending the definition of the
acceptable "nexus" enabling the state to tax out-of-state vendors:
1. Congressional legislation: A 1959 federal law (PL 86-272) forbids a state
from imposing a net income tax on an out-of-state vendor if the vendor's
only connection with the state is the solicitation of orders for tangible
personal property, and such orders are accepted and shipped from outside the
state. The law only applies to the sale of tangible goods, and hence does not
limit states in taxing services or a broad range of ancillary activities. It also
applies only to income taxes, and does not limit the application of other taxes
such as sales, capital, excise, etc. taxes.
2. A general limitation based on Supreme Court decisions, relating to "Due
Process" and "Commerce" clauses of the US constitution. The Due Process
clause may be violated if a state tax is imposed where there is no definitive
link or minimum connection of the taxpayer to the state.
A state tax, to be constitutionally valid, must in general
1. Apply to an activity with a "nexus" to the state
2. Not discriminate against inter-state or international commerce
3. Have some relationship to the services and protection of the state, and
4. Be fairly apportioned.
But in general, the Supreme Court has given a very broad latitude to the
states in the absence of Congressional direction otherwise.
The issues involving "nexus" are of increasing importance as international
trade grows in complexity as well as size. The growth of trade in
sophisticated and "high tech" goods frequently requires the foreign vendor to
expand on site sales arid technical assistance, and thus may create an issue as
to whether the vendor has sufficient "nexus" in the state to create a tax
liability.
Taxes Levied on Business
All provinces impose personal and corporate income taxes, and all provinces
except Alberta have a sales tax (imposed on the purchaser, but normally
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collected by the vendor). Many provinces have corporate capital taxes, at
effective rates higher than US states.
Most (but not all) states have corporate and personal income taxes, plus sales
on use taxes. In addition, many have capital taxes, franchise fees, and other
business levies with substantial variation in form.
In Canada, all provinces except Ontario, Alberta and Quebec employ the
federal government's tax collection agency to collect their provincial
corporate taxes, and four provinces have harmonized their sales taxes with
the federal government's GST.
Due to the long-standing tradition going back to the federal "rental" of
income tax fields in World War II, and subsequent tax co-operation
agreements, all of the provinces generally follow the federal tax base for
corporation as well as personal income tax. (While there are minor
differences, these are not generally important). Even Alberta, Ontario and
Quebec - who collect their own corporate tax - almost invariably follow the
federal rules, and do not operate a major independent tax audit process.
In the United States, a majority of states base their corporate taxes on federal
rules, but with some significant differences. There is considerably more
variation in the corporate tax base amongst US states, and between states and
the US federal government, than exists in Canada. The states also show
substantial variation in the application of sales and use taxes, capital taxes,
franchise fees, etc. Table 3 shows the variation in taxes on business amongst
the states: note that the heading "franchise" or "corporate franchise" can
involve a number of different taxes (capital, stock, gross revenue, etc.).
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Table 3 Chart of State Taxes
State
Alabama

Franchise

Corporate
Income

*

*

Alaska

*

Arizona

*

Arkansas

*

California

*

Colorado

*

Corporate
Franchise

Other
Corporate
Taxes

Connecticut
Delaware
District
Columbia

*

*

of

*

Florida
Georgia

*
*

*

Hawaii

*

Idaho

*

Illinois

*

*
*

Indiana

*

Iowa

*

Kansas

*

*

Kentucky

*

*

Louisiana

*

*

Maine

*

Maryland

*

Massachusetts

*

Michigan

*

Minnesota

*

*
*
*
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Mississippi

*

*

Missouri

*

*

Montana

*

Nebraska

*

*

Nevada
New Hampshire

*

New Jersey

*

New Mexico

*

New York
North Carolina

*

North Dakota

*

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

*

Pennsylvania

*

Rhode Island

*

*
*

*

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

*

*

Texas

*

*

Utah

*

Vermont

*

Virginia

*

Washington

*

West Virginia

*

Wisconsin
Wyoming

*

*
*

*
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Apportionment among Jurisdictions
Where an enterprise operates in two or more jurisdictions (in which it has a
sufficient nexus to be taxed), its income (or capital, etc) must be apportioned
between the jurisdictions in order for its overall tax burden to be rationally
determined.
In Canada, provinces uniformly follow federal rules for such apportionment,
based generally on a two factor (sales and wages) formula to allocate the tax
base only amongst jurisdictions in which - generally - they have a fixed
place of business ("permanent establishment"). In broad generality, this fixed
place of business concept is the same as the "permanent establishment" used
in international tax treaties as the basic requirement to be taxed in a
jurisdiction.
In the Unites States, a large number of states follow a fairly uniform method
of apportionment based on an inter-state model employing three factors
(sales, wages and assets). But there is significant variations:
1. in the detailed rules
2. in the weights given to factors, and
3. in determining what is sufficient "nexus" in a jurisdiction to require
apportionment to that state
Accordingly, the total of the incomes of an enterprise allocated to the
separate states in which it operates may be more or less than its actual total
income.
International Agreements
While the Canada-US tax treaty does not bind the provinces or states, there
are broad provisions in new agreements signed by these countries that may
affect provincial or state taxing statutes, including NAFTA, GATT, GATS,
and WTO conventions. To date, there had been little experience with these
new agreements and their potentially complex inter-action with sub-national
governments. In the longer run, such international agreements could have
major implications for sub-national tax regimes.
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Rates
Effective Canadian corporate income tax rates (combined federal/provincial)
have been equal to or in excess of US rates, but due to announced reductions
by the federal, Ontario and Alberta governments, effective combined rates in
some Canadian provinces are scheduled to fall to below US rates (to as low
as 30% - 33% including equivalent of capital taxes).
Conflicts in sub-national laws and practices
Just as trade and investment between countries can be retarded and damaged
by conflicts and inconsistencies in national tax laws, so international trade
can also be adversely affected by the actions and discrimination by subnational governments. Given the broad freedom of action available to
provinces and states, it is not surprising that serious concerns have been
expressed about the negative effect on Canada-US cross-border trade and
investment arising from the taxation rules and practices of individual
provinces and states.
Such adverse effects on cross-border activities can arise from:
1. Inconsistencies in the allocation methods followed by individual states and
provinces, so that part of the income of a corporate group operating in both
Canada and the United States is subject to double taxation. (In theory, such
inconsistencies in allocation could also result in some income not being taxed
at all at the sub-national level, but given the tendency of states and provinces
to seek to extend their tax base, this outcome is less likely). The California
unitary tax - a method of determining the allocation of income to the states
inconsistent with national or international norms - is just one example.
2.Differences in the tax base (for example, taxable income for corporate tax
purposes), so that the tax demanded by a state or province seems
disproportionate to the "real" income arising in the jurisdiction.
3. Direct or indirect discrimination against foreign businesses, in favour of
local enterprises.
4. Higher compliance and administrative costs by taxpayers, and increased
risks of retroactive assessment of taxes due to changes in both the
interpretation and application of complex statutes. (Efforts by some
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jurisdictions to get outside vendors to collect a tax on sales into the
jurisdiction can be an example).
Such actions can be damaging to trade and investment between Canada and
the US because they raise both the costs and risk of trans-border economic
activity.
Reasons for Damaging Actions
States and provinces engage in such actions for a variety of reasons
1. Simple greed, in an effort to get "foreigners" (who don't vote) to pay more
tax to allow native taxpayers (who do vote) to pay less
2. Ignorance, as where a jurisdiction does not appreciate the implication of its
actions, and
3. The exercise by a state or a province of its constitutional right to use
taxation as a legitimate tool of public policy so as to achieve its objectives.
All governments use taxation to achieve local policy goals, (such as
encouraging local industry), even though such use may be ill advised when
considered in a broader context, and states and provinces are no exception to
this. The benefits to a state of adopting some different approach to taxation
may seem clear, but the costs to trans-border activities (and ultimately to
maximizing productivity and economic gain) are less apparent.
Reconciling Differences and Conflicts
Canada and the United States, as well as most countries, have important
mechanisms in place to reconcile tax systems and eliminate trans-border
problems:
1. International tax treaties try to reconcile differing tax systems so as to
avoid double taxation and other problems.
2. Other treaties (NAFTA) may also assist in this regard.
3. Treaties contain mechanisms ("competent authority") allowing taxpayers
to engage governments in resolving conflicts, and
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4. Domestic tax law contains basic rules to avoid double tax and promote
fairness, such as the foreign tax credit.
Unfortunately, almost none of these features are available in dealing with tax
conflicts and unfairness at the state or provincial level. Further, given the
number of jurisdictions involved, it is impractical to think of dealing with the
problem by direct negotiations between the states and provinces.
Examples of Provincial and State Conflicts
Canada
Canada may have fewer examples of such conflicts, because provincial tax
rules are more uniform and to a large extent follow federal norms. However,
we have:
British Columbia
Threatened to make foreign vendors merely advertising in B.C. charge B.C.
sales tax: action not strongly implemented and possibly constitutionally
invalid.
Quebec
Has had differences in taxation of some branches of foreign companies: not a
current issue.
Ontario
Used to effectively tax royalties paid to related foreign parties (so as to share
in withholding tax revenues): law changed and problem largely dealt with.
General
Canadian tax incentives on some domestic activities (films) have been
considered as a form of discrimination.
There have been issues on collecting GST on sales into Canada, but these are
largely administrative.
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United States
The considerable diversity of state tax systems has led to such issues as:
CaliforniaUnitary Tax:
Some years ago, California sought to tax multinational corporations
operating in California not on an allocated share of their US income, but
instead on a share of the world-wide income of the entire consolidated group.
This was done on the basis that the entire global activity was one "unitary"
business. California's claims generated fierce opposition from foreign
multinationals, supported by their governments, as it could have led to a
dramatic increase in taxes and major complexities: the issues were hotly
debated but Congress was reluctant to intervene.
The California unitary tax approach - which was partially followed by some
other states - has some measure of theoretic support. However, it is totally
inconsistent with accepted norms of international taxation, and could result in
major double taxation - including California taxing income which was not
even allocable to the US under international rules (generally based on arm's
length separate accounting). Eventually California - and other states largely backed off the unitary concept for taxing the income of multinational
corporations, and adopted the "water's edge" approach which taxes only an
allocation of US source incomes. In part, the withdrawal of the unitary tax
approach was undertaken because of the realization that it could damage
international investment or incite retaliatory action.
Michigan Single Business Tax (SBT)
Michigan adopted the SBT in 1976: the tax is an unusual one since it is based
in theory on a business's total returns to labour, capital and profit. It was
based on taxable income for US federal purposes, but adding back wages,
interest and depreciation. There is a special deduction for fixed assets bought
for use in Michigan, and this is a major advantage to Michigan
manufacturers. However, as the tax was based on US federal taxable income,
it did not generally apply to Canadian companies selling goods into Michigan
as long as they did not have a permanent establishment there and hence had
no US federal taxable income.
In 1998, and with some degree of retroactivity, Michigan adopted a
substantially broader interpretation of the liability of Canadian and other
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non-Michigan vendors selling goods in Michigan. It did so following a
Supreme Court decision that held that the SBT was not an income tax, and
hence Michigan was not bound by US federal law restricting the application
of state income taxes to out-of-state vendors. Under the new interpretation,
any out-of-state vendor would now be liable for SBT if it has any sales or
other activity in the state, even if it did not have a permanent establishment.
The apportionment factor was also changed to emphasize sales.
The revised SBT would have had a very negative effect on Canadian
businesses selling into Michigan:
1. The SBT, as a non-income tax, would not qualify for a foreign tax credit in
Canada
2. The tax was frequently out of all proportion to the activities carried on in
Michigan
3. Through a variety of means such as incentives only available to in-state
producers, out of state vendors were likely to pay far more SBT than
Michigan manufacturers on the same volume of activity
4. Calculating the tax involved substantial complexities, and Michigan was
applying the tax retroactively
In 1999, after numerous representations, Michigan changed the SBT so as to
largely (not totally) exempt Canadians and other foreign vendors soliciting
sales in Michigan, provided they took care to pass title outside of Michigan.
The SBT would remain however as a source of compliance costs.
Unfortunately, this was not the end of Canadian concern about the SBT.
Following the 1999 amendments, Michigan revenue authorities issued two
draft interpretation bulletins on the revised law, largely saying what was
expected about the new rules. But on March 15, 2001, the Michigan revenue
authorities unexpectedly come out with a third draft interpretation which
reversed the previous understanding and would have included in the SBT
base for foreign companies the total world-wide deductions for depreciation
and some other items. The result would have been to re-create a horrendous
tax liability for a number of Canadian exporters. The issue is now (April
2001) back under consideration, and there are some indications that good
sense will prevail.
But the long saga of the Michigan SBT illustrates several points about local
tax issues. The first is that in most US states, there is no single decision or
power source: foreign vendors cannot simply raise concerns with the state
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administration, but can be forced to try to broker a solution with a number of
bodies - the state legislature, the Governor, the administration, and the
bureaucracy, all of whom must be involved in any resolution. And sometimes
it can go beyond this, and the foreign vendors can find themselves required
to build alliances and support with local businesses. The second point about
making representations and objections about an issue such as the SBT is that
legal processes can be of limited assistance. There were likely aspects of the
Michigan SBT that were unconstitutional because they discriminated against
foreign trade. But taking such an issue to the courts - first the state courts
and then the federal courts - would take many years. And even then the final
decision is unlikely to be clean cut: the courts could find only a few aspects
unconstitutional, and leave the rest in place.
Trying to resolve the concerns of foreign businesses about particular state tax
issues can therefore involve a lengthy, complex, and multi-pronged effort,
involving not only legal challenges but difficult negotiations and even public
relations efforts. The Canadian government will assist in representations in
many cases, but is compelled to work within these multiple processes. The
US federal authorities, while they may be sympathetic, may be of little
practical assistance.
Ohio, Pennsylvania,New York and Massachusetts- Trucking
While the issues concern a large number of states, examples are noted in the
attached (Table 4) for four of these states, including:
1. A Canadian trucking company making more than 12 trips through
Massachusetts (with or without stops) can be liable for the Corporations
Excise (Income) Tax, which includes both an income tax and a net worth tax
on tangible property base
2. A Canadian trucker making one pick-up or delivery in Ohio is liable for
tax (although it may be limited to the net worth franchise tax)
3. A Canadian trucker making more than three pick-ups or deliveries in New
York can be liable for New York Franchise Tax, which requires a calculation
of four different tax bases (net income, capital, minimum capital and fixed
dollar minimum), plus a franchise tax on capital stock requiring the
calculation of three different tax bases (issued capital stock, par value stock,
and minimum tax), plus a franchise tax on gross income.
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The taxes levied by US states on Canadian truckers are a significant source
of friction and add significantly to costs:
1. The states taxes may not be creditable against Canadian taxes because they
are not income taxes, or the total US taxes exceed the maximum credit in
Canada
2. The administrative work in calculating the taxes is substantial
3. These state taxes are more than US truckers would pay to Canadian
provinces in comparable circumstances.
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Table 4 Summary of State Tax Findings Trucking

I Massachusetts
NEXUS
CRITERIA

Makes 12 or
more pick-ups,
deliveries
or
trips
through
the state (or
any
combination
thereof)

Is
otherwise
doing business
in the state

NATURE
OF TAXES
IMPOSED

New York

Pennsylvania

12 trips More
Doing
than
business in through
50,000
a corporate the state, revenue miles
or
form,
or 20% of
employing
total miles in
capital in
the state AND
more
the
state,
owning or than
25,000
12 or more
leasing
miles in pick-ups
or
property
the state
deliveries in
the states
Maintainin
g an office one pick
or
in the state up
delivery
in
the
3 or more state
pick-ups or
deliveries
in
a
calendar
year

Tangible/intang Corporate
ible
property Franchise
tax, and
Tax, and

Corporate
income tax

Ohio

Franchise
tax
on
capital
stock, and

Net
Income
Tax, and

Capital
Stock/Franchi
se Tax

Net
Worth
Tax

Corporate Net
Income Tax
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Franchise
Tax
on
Gross
Earnings

APPORTIO
NMENT
METHOD
FOR THE
TRUCKING
INDUSTRY

Three
factor
apportionment
based
on
property,
payroll
and
double
weighted sales

New York
Revenue
Miles
during the
year as a
percentage
of Revenue
Miles
Everywher
e
during
the year

Three
factor
apportion
ment
based on
property,
payroll
and sales

Revenue miles
within
PA
during
the
year
as a
percentage of
total revenue
miles
everywhere
during
the
year

DOES THE
STATE
ADOPT
THE
PROVISION
S OF THE
CANADAUS
TAX
TREATY

Yes,
with
respect to the
net
income
portion of the
tax only

No,
requires the
add back of
Treaty
Exempt
Income

Yes, with
respect to
the
net
income
portion
of the tax
only

No, requires
the add back
of
Treaty
Exempt
Income

iS
THE
STATE TAX
CREDITAB
LE

Only

Only to the Only

to

extent the
imposed
based on
income

extent the
tax
imposed is
based on
net income

to Only to

the extent
the
tax
imposed
is based
on
net
income

extent the
imposed
based on
income
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Electronic Commerce
Electronic commerce does not give rise to hugely new and different tax
issues - with the possible exception of "digital" products (videos, audio,
books, software) distributed by electronics with no intervening physical
product.
However, broad trends to globalization and advanced technology result in
growing international E-Commerce intensifying problems and issues that
already exist.
Sales Taxes
Business to Business: tax can likely be collected in most cases from recipient
located in jurisdiction through self-assessment backed up by audit. Issues
include identifying where software is consumed, and the nature of software
payments (goods? royalties?).
Business to Consumer: purchases by a consumer from out of state vendors
create collection problems for states/provinces. Trans-border sales involving
physical goods can be caught at border. (Canadian authorities endeavour to
collect federal and provincial sales taxes on trans-border sales over $20).
Provinces and states would like out of state/province vendors to register and
collect tax - but they may have no "nexus" in jurisdiction to compel this. The
constitutional issue is whether a web-site is sufficient "nexus" (likely not),
but the practical issue is in trying to get external vendors to cope with
complexities (exemptions, etc) and reporting.
Cross-border
In the US, there are multi-state processes to try to achieve tax co-operation
and collection. Trans-border shipments may require similar co-operative
efforts.
Efforts - as in Europe - to try to expand nexus rules to include servers, etc.
are unlikely to be successful.
Both states and provinces face alternatives in long run:
1. Harmonize sales taxes into an integrated package, co-ordinated with
national governments and international trade rules, or
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2. Face modest but growing revenues loss
Corporate Tax
Major issues for both national and sub-national governments is to overhaul
present allocation and base rules to deal with growing E-commerce. Many
efforts being made to force foreign E-vendors to register and pay corporate
tax on profits on sales into the jurisdiction - but these not likely to be totally
successful.
Answer may involve new international efforts to revise allocation rules to
take account of E-commerce issues. Provinces/states are likely to be able to
deal with issues only in context of such a broader agreement. Result may be
classic case of conflict between desired autonomy and freedom of action of
states/provinces, and the realities of highly competitive and complex global
markets demanding co-operative actions.
Conclusion
The interplay of differing and complex provincial/state tax systems tends to
impose a significant detriment to trade and investment between Canada and
the United States. While many issues have been resolved over time, others
remain and new taxing initiatives tend to create new problems.
The basic difficulty lies in the complex diversity of tax systems employed by
the provinces and states: the differing measures give rise to inconsistencies in
the circumstances giving rise to the liability to tax ("nexus"), and then the tax
base itself and the issue of how that base should be apportioned amongst the
jurisdictions in which the enterprise operates. These differences give rise to
conflicts that involve double or excess taxation, to intentional or accidental
discrimination against foreign taxpayers, and to undue complexity and
compliance costs.
The differences in sub-national taxing systems give rise to excess costs and
problems in a number of areas:
1. A number of the taxes involved (state franchise taxes, etc.) are not income
taxes and hence are not creditable by the taxpayer for foreign tax credit
purposes at the federal level. Even if the taxes may be considered the
equivalent of income taxes (and Canada gives some unilateral relief in this
area) the differing base may rule out full creditability. The result is that the
tax becomes an additional cost.
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2. The complexities of differing definitions of nexus, and varying allocation
formulas, can mean that the same income can be taxed twice.
3. The complex issues involved, and the possibility of retroactive application,
increase costs including compliance costs, and add risks to international
commerce.
Of course, it must be noted that US companies engaged in inter-state trade
face many of the same difficulties as do Canadian and other foreign
companies making sales into the US. However, Canadian companies may
have found the task of coping with these problems more awkward than their
US peers because the state tax systems are so different than the norm in
Canada.
The same sort of issues arise in international trade and investment with
respect to differing national tax laws. But in the case of sub-national
governments, there are no ready mechanisms available to reconcile these
differences - no international tax treaties, or competent authority
consultations. Whatever voluntary consultation on issues does take place on
sub-national conflicts tends to be complex, as it can involve the two federal
Governments, various states or provinces, plus trade groups in a rather
unstructured process. And in the US, legal actions to raise constitutional
issues have to be taken first to the state courts, and then appealed to the
federal courts - a very time consuming and expensive route.
Based on revenue statistics, it might seem that the Canadian provinces would
be more likely than the US states to impose aggressive taxes: the provinces
have generally heavier tax burdens, rely more on corporate taxes, and have
much higher debt levels. But - at least to this observer - most of the tax
conflicts originate with the states. The reason is not hard to find: the
provinces have a long history of basing income (and some other) taxes on the
Canadian federal model, and provincial taxation in Canada tends both to be
more uniform, and more in tune with federal (and international) norms than
is the case in the US.
The Canadian provinces used to have conflicting and diverse tax systems noted as a "tax jungle" in the Rowell-Sirois report of 1940. But a very
substantial degree of harmonization and co-ordination was introduced in the
1940's, and has largely persisted since it offers advantages to taxpayers and
tax collectors alike.

Brown-ROLES OFSTATES/PROVINCES IN TAXATION

This high degree of co-ordination in Canadian tax system may be showing
signs of breaking down. The desire of the provinces for more autonomy and
tax structures more in tune with their objectives, is leading to pressures to
break away from the federal norms in base definition and allocation. The
trend is in many ways regrettable: the provincial initiatives may well create a
diversity that could imperil inter-provincial and international trade (as well as
being economically misguided).
The US Congress has the authority to impose more uniform and tradecompatible tax standards on the US states. But Congress has been reluctant because of political and philosophic reasons - to exercise their rights and
rationalize state taxation systems. The Canadian Parliament, with likely less
authority, has been equally unwilling to get involved (although it does
subsidize collection costs for provinces willing to let the federal government
administer their systems on a common basis).
The fundamental conflict is between the desire of the states and provinces to
have the flexibility and autonomy to use their tax systems to achieve local
objectives, and the imperatives of increased collaboration and co-operation in
a world of growing cross-border trade and investment The conflict will not
be easily resolved, but the following steps would assist in improving the
Canada-US business environment:
1. Increase recognition by states and provinces of the heightened costs of
diversity and incompatibility in tax systems: ultimately, every one loses from
a proliferation of incompatible systems that retard trade.
2. A more formal mechanism between Canada and the United States for joint
federal/provincial/state consultation on sub-national tax issues.
3. Co-ordination between states so as to further develop models for tax
system compatibility.
4. Ultimately, some agreed framework for state and provincial tax measures,
extending possibly to making international tax treaties binding on subnational governments.
The fundamental aim must be to deal objectively and systematically with
state and provincial issues that prevent the people of both countries from
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reaping the maximum benefits from the free trade and investment policies
already adopted.

